The Effect of IFN-γ, Alum and Complete Freund Adjuvant on TNP-KLH Induced Ig.G1, IgE and IgG2a Responses in Mice

Adjuvants are considered to play an important role in directing the isotype and amount of antibodies produced upon immunization by conducting the development of either Th-1 or Th-2 cells upon T-cell stimulation. This is based on the different cytokine production patterns that were observed after in vitro resttmulation of T cells isolated from mice immunized with antigen either adsorbed on alum or emulsified in complete Freund adjuvant (CFA). However, other studies suggest that primarily the type of antigen determines which isotypes are produced and to what extent. In these studies, however, IgE was not determined. Therefore, this study examined whether alum and CFA influenced the amount and/or ratio of IgG1, IgE and IgG2a produced after TNP-KLH immunization. Similar levels of IgG1, IgE and IgG2a antibodies were found upon immunization with TNP-KLH either adsorbed on alum or emulsified in CFA. Moreover, administration of IFN-γ in combination with TNP-KLH adsorbed on alum did not increase the amount of IgG2a produced. IFN-γ treatment resulted in an increased IL-6 and decreased IFN-γ production by spleen cells upon Con A stimulation, whereas it did not change the IL-4 production in similar conditions. The presented results suggest that upon immunization with TNP-KLH high IL-4 levels are produced, resulting in an antibody response that is dominated by IgG1, independent of the adjuvant employed. The IL-4 inducing property of TNP-KLH is substantiated by the finding that repeated immunization of mice with TNP-KI, without adjuvant, increases the serum total IgE level. The presented data suggest that the carrier part of TNP-KLH preferentially results in Th-2 cell activity after which the adjuvant merely enhances the antibody responses generated

Improved Classical Cryptanalysis of SIKE in Practice

Item does not contain fulltextPKC 202

SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Captive Hippos (Hippopotamus amphibius), Belgium.

Two adult female hippos in Zoo Antwerp who were naturally infected with SARS-CoV-2 showed nasal discharge for a few days. Virus was detected by immunocytochemistry and PCR in nasal swab samples and by PCR in faeces and pool water. Serology was also positive. No treatment was necessary

NTRU Prime

Several ideal-lattice-based cryptosystems have been broken by recent attacks that exploit special structures of the rings used in those cryptosystems. The same structures are also used in the leading proposals for post-quantum lattice-based cryptography, including the classic NTRU cryptosystem and typical Ring-LWE-based cryptosystems

Short generators without quantum computers: the case of multiquadratics

Finding a short element g of a number field, given the ideal generated by g, is a classic problem in computational algebraic number theory. Solving this problem recovers the private key in cryptosystems introduced by Gentry, Smart–Vercauteren, Gentry–Halevi, Garg– Gentry–Halevi, et al. Work over the last few years has shown that for some number fields this problem has a surprisingly low post-quantum security level. This paper shows, and experimentally verifies, that for some number fields this problem has a surprisingly low pre-quantum security level

Creating cryptographic challenges using multi-party computation : the LWE challenge

Practical hardness results are necessary to select parameters for cryptographic schemes. Cryptographic challenges proved to be useful for determining the practical hardness of computational problems that are used to build public-key cryptography. However, several of these problems have the drawback that it is not known how to create a challenge for them without knowing the solutions. Hence, for these problems the creators of the challenges are excluded from participating. In this work, we present a method to create cryptographic challenges without excluding anyone from participating. This method is based on secure multi-party computation (MPC). We demonstrate that the MPC-based approach is indeed feasible by using it to build a challenge for the learning with errors (LWE) problem. The LWE problem is one of the most important problems in lattice-based cryptography. The security of many cryptographic schemes that have been proposed in the last decade is directly based on it. We identify parameters for LWE instances that provide the appropriate hardness level for a challenge while representing instances used to instantiate encryption schemes as close as possible. The LWE challenge is designed to determine the practical hardness of LWE, to gain an overview of the best known LWE solvers, and to motivate additional research effort in this direction

Sliding right into disaster : left-to-right sliding windows leak

It is well known that constant-time implementations of modular exponentiation cannot use sliding windows. However, software libraries such as Libgcrypt, used by GnuPG, continue to use sliding windows. It is widely believed that, even if the complete pattern of squarings and multiplications is observed through a side-channel attack, the number of exponent bits leaked is not sufficient to carry out a full key-recovery attack against RSA. Specifically, 4-bit sliding windows leak only 40% of the bits, and 5-bit sliding windows leak only 33% of the bits. In this paper we demonstrate a complete break of RSA-1024 as implemented in Libgcrypt. Our attack makes essential use of the fact that Libgcrypt uses the left-to-right method for computing the sliding-window expansion. We show for the first time that the direction of the encoding matters: the pattern of squarings and multiplications in left-to-right sliding windows leaks significantly more information about the exponent than right-to-left. We show how to extend the Heninger-Shacham algorithm for partial key reconstruction to make use of this information and obtain a very efficient full key recovery for RSA-1024. For RSA-2048 our attack is efficient for 13% of keys

How to manipulate curve standards: a white paper for the black hat

This paper analyzes the cost of breaking ECC under the following assumptions: (1) ECC is using a standardized elliptic curve that was actually chosen by an attacker; (2) the attacker is aware of a vulnerability in some curves that are not publicly known to be vulnerable. This cost includes the cost of exploiting the vulnerability, but also the initial cost of computing a curve suitable for sabotaging the standard. This initial cost depends heavily upon the acceptability criteria used by the public to decide whether to allow a curve as a standard, and (in most cases) also upon the chance of a curve being vulnerable. This paper shows the importance of accurately modeling the actual acceptability criteria: i.e., figuring out what the public can be fooled into accepting. For example, this paper shows that plausible models of the “Brainpool acceptability criteria” allow the attacker to target a onein- a-million vulnerability and that plausible models of the “Microsoft NUMS criteria” allow the attacker to target a one-in-a-hundred-thousand vulnerability